After the Champions League defeat to Benfica, one has to seriously ask: But the 3-5-2 system referred to by Paulo Di Canio is the most suitable system for Juventus who are in difficulty, is it really the solution to the solutions or at least the most realistic one? I will not say neither one nor the other, given that in the two matches that were played in the Cup, the Bianconeri conceded in this way. It is clear It is not enough to add an additional central element to a better defense, or worse, to find the defensive spirit of Juventus’ elusive nuclear core. Nor is it just a matter of the game system. Don’t get me wrong here: I don’t want to slip into easy psychology as often happens after these introductions. It’s not like the players don’t have mental energy or anything like that. Di Maria’s attitude has nothing to do with her smile with her former teammates at the end of the race, rather than walking the curve to “put her face on it” in compliance with a painful and humiliating ritual that “must” be followed in these cases. number. There are tangible tactical inconsistencies in Juventus’ 3-5-2 interpretation. Micro-events that systematically generate problems on the field when facing a certain type of opponent. These are things to see and touch, and have nothing to do with the smoky, prepackaged interior, showing regret at the end of the race and saying the magic formula “Now shut up and work.” In this article I will examine only two fairly important dynamics, which alone break the 3-5-2 cliché as the most solid and realistic unit of all.
The five and the third behind them – Compared to the supernatural (and unsuccessful) interpretation of the first half in Paris, the 3-5-2 way Juve started the match against Benfica seemed more ambitious., even if it is no less manipulable. The team pressured initially higher with the fives, buoyed by the work of their arms. On the other hand, Cuadrado Bremer series.
On the other hand, Kostic-Danilo.
In theory, there was a “leg” on both sides to be able to handle this kind of exit and ascent, but in reality what often happened was: A gap for the man between the lines who found plenty of space available.
This is because There is a contradiction between the behavior and nature of the fifths and weapons involved and Bonucci’s classic “escape.” (see above). Or rather, the unwillingness (or ability to) play one-on-one with all the defenders (Allegri’s possible surrender). But if Bremer encounters doubts from time to time, it is because he is faced with a contradiction between his advances, his recklessness, and the systematic retreat of his new fellow in management, who he suspects is always rushing to the door. Thus, holes are not created in the back, but in front of the defensive line and teams that pile up like Benfica, those holes know how to exploit them. With the return of Alex Sandro, wanting to maintain this triple play system, however unusual, an entirely Brazilian trio, more dynamic and aggressive, and with Bremer finally in the center, in the role he played in Turin, it will be even more effective. But this is only one possible alternative.
Are the walls filtered or not? – Another contradiction that generates imbalances concerns the central axis. Let’s focus on a moment Paredes: But does it guarantee the presence of a candidate or not in front of the defense? Sometimes, like in the pictures we saw above, you might get the impression that you find it “out of place”. On what does this fact depend? Partly always from Bonucci’s escape, partly not. Paredes, like Bremer, still has his mind on certain principles. They’re neural circuits, and there’s not much you can do. Now, PSG certainly didn’t play like Jorich Paul, but it’s true that both coaches always ask to defend forward (with the necessary differences of course). And therefore He instinctively leaves Paredes every now and then, getting into a mode of re-aggression and then being surprised if his buddies don’t follow. And in a more rigorous context like that of Allegri’s Juventus, such situations arise.
Cuadrado loses the ball in search of the penalty kick (by the way, are we sure that the Colombian is still suitable as Di Canio claims for this kind of role?), I said, Cuadrado, fifth, loses the ball, then you can see Paredes leave. It’s the 3-5-2 low top. If you go out this way, you have to be supported or at least make sure you get there first, or else your trip will be bad. Here is an example of what “bad running” means.
He is used to Paris Saint-Germain to behave this way with his colleagues who thought the same. Here, however, is the victim of a small bull. The deadliest result, however, we find in the continuation of the work: it is the hole created in the midfield.
These are scenes from the whole first half 3-5-2, when Di Maria had not yet entered for the “unbalance” of the team. If you are beyond do not accept numerical equivalence (in this case in transition), A distance that opponents find in front of the line. Look in the middle while Merity is crucified. All will always have three power plants on the attackers, and in the end they lose pretty hard anyway…